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Abstract:  
We develop an estimated model of the U.S. economy in which agents form expectations by 
continually updating their beliefs regarding the behavior of the economy and monetary policy. 
We explore the effects of policymakers' misperceptions of the natural rate of unemployment 
during the late 1960s and 1970s on the formation of expectations and macroeconomic 
outcomes. We find that the combination of monetary policy directed at tight stabilization of 
unemployment near its perceived natural rate and large real-time errors in estimates of the 
natural rate uprooted heretofore quiescent in inflation expectations and destabilized the 
economy. Had monetary policy reacted less aggressively to perceived unemployment gaps, in 
inflation expectations would have remained anchored and the stag inflation of the 1970s would 
have been avoided. Indeed, we find that less activist policies would have been more effective at 
stabilizing both in inflation and unemployment. We argue that policymakers, learning from the 
experience of the 1970s, eschewed activist policies in favor of policies that concentrated on the 
achievement of price stability, contributing to the subsequent improvements in macroeconomic 
performance of the U.S. economy. 
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 Non-technical summary
The \New Economics" of the 1960s prescribed activist policies aimed at achieving and
maintaining full employment of economic resources. According to this view, active man-
agement of aggregate demand would counteract any shortfalls or excesses relative to the
economy's potential and thus attain the holy grail of macroeconomic policy: sustained pros-
perity with price stability. This faith in macroeconomic stabilization policy reﬂected the
culmination of methodological advances in macroeconomic modeling, econometrics, and op-
timal control. The enviable performance of the U.S. economy in the rst half of the 1960s
appeared to validate the promise of the \New Economics," but this success proved to be
ﬂeeting. In the second half of the 1960s, prosperity was purchased at the cost of rising in-
ﬂation. Worse, the prosperity of the 1960s was soon overshadowed by the stagﬂation{high
inﬂation accompanied by high unemployment{in the 1970s.
In this paper, we reexamine the sources of stagﬂation in the 1970s, and argue that the
combination of monetary policy directed at tight stabilization of the unemployment rate
near its perceived natural rate and severe underestimation of the natural rate, rather than
adverse supply shocks, explains much of the woeful performance of the U.S. economy in the
1970s. With hindsight, it is clear that policymakers in the 1960s and much of the 1970s
were far too optimistic of how low the unemployment rate could go before igniting inﬂation
pressures. Given the activist bent of policymakers inﬂuenced by the \New Economics,"
these natural rate misperceptions contributed to an extended period of policy being ex-
cessively stimulative, resulting in rising inﬂation (see Orphanides 2002, 2003a,b, 2004, and
Orphanides and Williams, 2002).
A key element in our analysis is the endogenous evolution of expectations formation
in response to the tumultuous economic developments of the late 1960s and 1970s. We
develop an estimated model of the U.S. economy in which private agents have imperfect
knowledge of the true structure of the economy and policy. In the model, agents are assumed
to continuously update their beliefs about the reduced-form structure of the economy and
monetary policy. As discussed in Orphanides and Williams (2003, forthcoming), this process
of perpetual learning propagates the direct eects of policy errors onto inﬂation expectations
and back on the economy.According to our model, the combination of stimulative monetary policy and rising
inﬂation during the late 1960s and 1970s contributed to public confusion regarding the
Federal Reserve's objectives and the behavior of inﬂation. Although inﬂation expectations
were initially well-anchored owing to the period of price stability in the 1950s and early
1960s, this advantage was squandered during the late 1960s as policy errors and the resulting
rise in inﬂation caused inﬂation expectations to drift upward. By the time that the supply
shocks of the 1970s hit, inﬂation expectations were already unmoored, exacerbating the
response to the shocks and contributing to stagﬂation. It is worth noting that our results
do not rely on policy being inherently destabilizing in the pre-1979 period, as emphasized
by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000). In fact, the feedback rule that we estimate for the
pre-1979 period based on real-time data features a greater than one-for-one response of
nominal rates to inﬂation. What is crucial is that policy responded strongly to perceived
unemployment rate gaps during that period.
We nd that had monetary policy not reacted as aggressively to perceived unemployment
gaps as it did, inﬂation expectations would have remained anchored and the stagﬂation
of the 1970s would have been avoided, despite the dramatic increases in oil prices and
the productivity slowdown during that period. Importantly, according to our model, less
activist policies would have done a better job of stabilizing both inﬂation and unemployment
in the 1970s. This is a lesson that policymakers themselves appeared to recognize by the
end of the 1970s. At that time, with inﬂation seemingly spiraling out of control, monetary
policymakers in the United States changed course, eschewing the ne-tuning of the \New
Economics" and concentrating instead on the goal of price stability. Following the costly
disinﬂation of the early 1980s, less activist monetary policy, as evidenced by a reduced
policy responsiveness to the perceived unemployment gap, contributed to a new era of
relatively stable inﬂation and unemployment. Our model helps explain this evolution in
the understanding of the role of monetary policy and the critical nature of maintaining well
anchored inﬂation expectations as a means for ensuring long-term economic stability.1 Introduction
The \New Economics" of the 1960s prescribed activist policies aimed at achieving and main-
taining full employment of economic resources. According to this view, active management
of aggregate demand would counteract any shortfalls or excesses relative to the economy's
potential and thus attain the holy grail of macroeconomic policy: sustained prosperity with
price stability. This faith in macroeconomic stabilization policy reﬂected the culmination of
methodological advances in macroeconomic modeling, econometrics, and optimal control.1
The zeitgeist of the \New Economics" is nicely summarized by Walter Heller (1966):
The promise of modern economic policy, managed with an eye to maintain-
ing prosperity, subduing inﬂation, and raising the quality of life, is indeed great.
And although we have made no startling conceptual breakthroughs in economics
in recent years, we have, more eectively than ever before, harnessed the ex-
isting economics|the economics that has been taught in the nation's college
classrooms for some twenty years|to the purposes of prosperity, stability, and
growth. (page 116, emphasis in original.)
The enviable performance of the U.S. economy in the rst half of the 1960s appeared
to validate the claims of Heller, but this success proved to be ﬂeeting. In the second half
of the 1960s, prosperity was purchased at the cost of rising inﬂation, as seen in Figure 1.
Worse, the prosperity of the 1960s was soon overshadowed by the stagﬂation{high inﬂation
accompanied by high unemployment{in the 1970s.
In this paper, we reexamine the sources of stagﬂation in the 1970s, and argue that the
combination of monetary policy directed at tight stabilization of the unemployment rate
near its perceived natural rate and severe underestimation of the natural rate, rather than
adverse supply shocks, explains much of the woeful performance of the U.S. economy in the
1970s. With hindsight, it is clear that policymakers in the 1960s and much of the 1970s
were far too optimistic of how low the unemployment rate could go before igniting inﬂation
pressures. Given the activist bent of policymakers inﬂuenced by the \New Economics," these
natural rate misperceptions contributed to an extended period of policy being excessively
stimulative, resulting in rising inﬂation.2
1See Heller (1966), Tobin (1966, 1972) and Okun (1970) for discussions of the ideas associated with the
\New Economics" of the 1960s. Application of control methods for macroeconomic stabilization had been
discussed at least as early as Lerner (1944) and formalized by Phillips (1954). Friedman's (1947) review of
Lerner (1944) oers an early critique of the application of these methods for macroeconomic stabilization.
2See Orphanides (2002, 2003a,b, 2004), Orphanides and Williams (2002), Bullard and Eusepi (2003),
Collard and Dellas (2004), and Cukierman and Lippi (2003).
1A key element in our analysis is the endogenous evolution of expectations formation
in response to the tumultuous economic developments of the late 1960s and 1970s. We
develop an estimated model of the U.S. economy in which private agents have imperfect
knowledge of the true structure of the economy and policy. In the model, agents are assumed
to continuously update their beliefs about the reduced-form structure of the economy and
monetary policy. As discussed in Orphanides and Williams (2003, forthcoming), this process
of perpetual learning propagates the direct eects of policy errors onto inﬂation expectations
and back on the economy.
According to our model, the combination of stimulative monetary policy and rising in-
ﬂation during the late 1960s and 1970s contributed to private agent confusion regarding the
Federal Reserve's objectives and the behavior of inﬂation. Although inﬂation expectations
were initially well-anchored owing to the period of price stability in the 1950s and early
1960s, this advantage was squandered during the late 1960s as policy errors and the result-
ing rise in inﬂation caused inﬂation expectations to drift upward.3 B yt h et i m et h a tt h e
supply shocks of the 1970s hit, inﬂation expectations were already unmoored, exacerbating
the response to the shocks and contributing to stagﬂation. It is worth noting that our results
do not rely on policy being inherently destabilizing in the pre-1979 period, as emphasized
by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000). In fact, the feedback rule that we estimate for the
pre-1979 period based on real-time data features a greater than one-for-one response of
nominal rates to inﬂation. What is crucial for our results is that policy responded strongly
to perceived unemployment rate gaps during that period as indicated by our estimated
policy feedback rule.
We nd that had monetary policy not reacted as aggressively to perceived unemployment
gaps as it did, inﬂation expectations would have remained anchored and the stagﬂation
of the 1970s would have been avoided, despite the dramatic increases in oil prices and
the productivity slowdown during that period. Importantly, according to our model, less
activist policies would have done a better job of stabilizing both inﬂation and unemployment
3The favorable environment of inﬂation expectations in the early 1960s can be largely attributed to
the greater emphasis on price stability relative to economic stabilization before the decade of the 1960s.
See Romer and Romer (2002) and Orphanides (2003c) for discussions highlighting some underappreciated
positive aspects of the policy environment during this period.
2in the 1970s. This is a lesson that policymakers themselves appeared to recognize by end
of the 1970s. At that time, with inﬂation seemingly spiraling out of control, monetary
policymakers in the United States changed course, eschewing the ne-tuning of the \New
Economics" and concentrating instead on the goal of price stability. Indeed, in 1978, before
he became Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Paul Volcker alluded to
the nature of the required change:4
Wider recognition of the limits on the ability of demand management to keep
the economy at a steady full employment path, especially when expectations are
hypersensitive to the threat of more inﬂation, provides a more realistic starting
point for policy formulation. (1978 p. 61.)
Following the costly disinﬂation of the early 1980s, less activist monetary policy, as evi-
denced by a reduced policy responsiveness to the perceived unemployment gap, contributed
to a new era of relatively stable inﬂation and unemployment. Our model helps explain
this evolution in the understanding of the role of monetary policy and the critical nature
of maintaining well anchored inﬂation expectations as a means for ensuring long-term eco-
nomic stability.
2 Natural Rate Misperceptions and Policy Activism
The success of activist stabilization policy rests on the assumption that the natural rate is
a useful policy target. Under that assumption, adjusting aggregate demand relative to the
economy's natural rate becomes the focus of short-term stabilization policy. Many of the
policy errors associated with the Great Inﬂation of the late 1960s and 1970s can be traced
to the pursuit of too low of a target of the natural rate of unemployment.
Figure 2 plots the rate of unemployment in the United States since the end of 1965
(the beginning of the Great Inﬂation) and two measures of the natural rate, a real-time
measure, that is, perceptions as of the time shown, and a retrospective measure, that is,
a current estimate. We take the current Congressional Budget Oce (CBO) (2001, 2002)
estimates of the natural rate of unemployment as truth. We construct a real-time series
4During the early stages of the disinﬂationary policy pursued following the 1979 policy change, Chairman
Volcker often stressed the importance of policies anchoring inﬂation expectations.
3for the natural rate guided by written documents that oer glimpses of the thinking of
policymakers of the 1960s and 1970s. During the 1960s, four percent was widely accepted
as a reasonable working denition of the full employment rate of unemployment.5 Although
we do not have precise information for the evolution of real-time perceptions of the natural
rate of unemployment in the early 1970s, we do know that many estimates rose during that
period, as reﬂected in various policy-related studies.6 Correspondingly, we posit that per-
ceptions of the natural rate rose to around 4.5 percent in 1970 from the 4 percent estimates
that prevailed earlier.7 Published accounts of Federal Reserve Board model exercises and
estimates by the Council of Economic Advisers reported in the Economic Report of the
President indicate that natural rate estimates continued to rise during the 1970s. From the
late 1970s to the present, the CBO has regularly reported, explicitly or implicitly, its esti-
mates of the natural rate in its publications regarding the economic and budget outlook,
and for those years we use the contemporaneous values for our real-time estimates from
these CBO publications.8
Comparison of the real-time perceptions likely held by policymakers at the time and
our best current measures of the natural rate, then, provide a summary indicator of the
potential policy errors that may be committed when an activist approach to stabilization
policy is pursued. The top panel of Figure 3 shows our real-time and retrospective estimates
of the natural rate of unemployment. The bottom panel of the gure plots the implied
natural rate misperceptions|measured as the \true" value minus the real-time estimate|
from 1965 through 2003. As seen in the gure, natural rate misperceptions have tended
to be highly persistent. The rst-order serial correlation of this series over this sample is
0.98. Interestingly, the average magnitude of real-time misperceptions has declined over the
5Recollections of key policymakers of that period, including Walter Heller, Arthur Okun and Herbert
Stein, who served as members and chairs of the Council of Economic Advisers in the 1960s and early 1970s,
as well as Federal Reserve Chairman Arthur Burns serve as evidence of the wide acceptance of that estimate.
See Burns (1979), Heller (1966), Okun (1962, 1970), and Stein (1984, 1996).
6See, for example, the discussion in Hall (1970) and Perry (1970).
7As a robustness check, we considered alternative paths for the real-time estimates in the model-based
simulation exercises reported below. The precise dating of the evolution of perceptions regarding the rise of
the natural rate from 4 percent in the late 1960s to 5 percent in the late 1970s does not materially inﬂuence
our simulations, as both the pattern and size of the resulting misperceptions remain broadly similar under
such alternatives, given that the retrospective estimates for this period, at about 6 percent, are always higher
by a considerable margin.
8The real-time and retrospective natural rate estimates of the most recent ve years are identical, reﬂect-
ing the fact that the CBO's estimates are unchanged over that period.
4past several decades. This appearance of diminishing errors may be overstated, however,
because these calculations of \errors" implicitly assume that the current CBO method of
estimating the natural rate is correctly specied. The real-time and retrospective estimates
in the latter part of the sample have been constructed by the CBO using the same method
(based on a Kalman lter), while the \misperceptions" in the earlier part of the sample also
reﬂect dierences in methodology. If the current methodology used by the CBO proves to
be inadequate, then the dierence between real-time estimates and retrospective estimates
in the 1980s and 1990s may widen in the future.9
Examples from the 1970s illustrate the problem associated with adopting an activist
approach to stabilization policy when one may be mistaken as to the size or even the sign
of the unemployment (or output) gap in real time.10 Consider the policy error of the early
1970s. With unemployment rising during and after the recession that started at the end of
1969, and in light of available estimates of the natural rate of unemployment, policymakers
could have reasonably held the view that the economy was operating with considerable
slack. The activist policy prescription at the time was clear cut: pursue additional monetary
expansion to bring the unemployment rate down. Moreover, the existing slack should have
led to some welcome disinﬂation despite the additional stimulus. Indeed, such a policy was
pursued at the time. But, based on the retrospective estimates of the natural rate, it is
now clear that that policy prescription represented a large error. The economic expansion
pursued in 1971-73 pushed aggregate demand far above the economy's potential, as this is
currently understood, fueling an increase in inﬂation. A similar error occurred after the
1975 recession, contributing to a further rise in inﬂation.
3 A Simple Estimated Model of the U.S. Economy
We examine the interaction of natural rate misperceptions, learning, and expectations for
alternative monetary policy rules using a simple quarterly forward-looking model we de-
veloped in Orphanides and Williams (2002). The specication of the model is unchanged
9See Orphanides and Williams (2002) for a detailed discussion of the sensitivity of measures of natural
rate misperceptions to the assumption of the correct estimation method.
10See Orphanides and van Norden (2002) and Orphanides and Williams (2002) for summary documentation
of the magnitude of the problem of real-time measurement of the natural rates of output and unemployment,
respectively.
5from that paper; however, we have reestimated the structural equations using the retrospec-
tive and real-time estimates of the natural rate of unemployment reported in the preceding
section and, for simplicity, we have imposed a constant implicit natural rate of interest.
3.1 The Structural Model
The model consists of the following two structural equations:
t = e
t+1 +( 1− )t−1 + (ue
t − u
t)+e;t;e   iid(0;2
e); (1)
ut = uue
t+1+1ut−1+2ut−2+(1−u−1−2)u
t +u (~ ra
t−1−r)+eu;t;e u  iid(0;2
eu);
(2)
where  denotes the annualized log dierence of the GNP or GDP price deﬂator, u denotes
the unemployment rate, u denotes the true natural rate of unemployment, ~ ra denotes
the real interest rate based on the one-year Treasury bill, and r the natural real rate of
interest. This model combines forward-looking elements of the New Synthesis model studied
by Goodfriend and King (1997), Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), Clarida, Gali and Gertler
(1999), and McCallum and Nelson (1999), and others, with the intrinsic inﬂation and inertia
in the level of economic activity featured in Fuhrer and Moore (1995), Brayton et al (1997),
Smets (2000), Fuhrer and Rudebusch (forthcoming), and others.
The \Phillips curve" in this model (equation 1) relates inﬂation (measured as the an-
nualized percent change in the GNP or GDP price index, depending on the period) during
quarter t to lagged inﬂation, expected future inﬂation, and expectations of the unemploy-
ment gap during the quarter, using the retrospective estimates of the natural rate discussed
below. The estimated parameter  measures the importance of expected inﬂation on the
determination of inﬂation. The unemployment equation (equation 2) relates the unem-
ployment gap during quarter t to the expected future unemployment gap, two lags of the
unemployment gap, and the lagged real interest rate gap. Here two elements importantly
reﬂect forward-looking behavior. The rst element is the estimated parameter u,w h i c h
measures the importance of expected unemployment, and the second is the duration of the
real interest rate, which serves as a summary of the inﬂuence of interest rates of various
maturities on economic activity. Because data on long-run inﬂation expectations are not
available, we limit the duration of the real rate to one year.
6One diculty in estimating this model is that expected inﬂation and unemployment
are not directly observed. Instrumental variable and full-information maximum likelihood
methods impose the restriction that the behavior of monetary policy and the formation
of expectations be constant over time, neither of which appears tenable over our sample
period (1969{2002). Instead, as in Orphanides and Williams (2002), we follow the approach
suggested by Roberts (1997), and also employed by Rudebusch (2002), and use the Survey
of Professional Forecasters as the source for proxies for expectations. Specically, we use
the median values of the forecasts provided in the Survey and posit that the relevant expec-
tations are those formed in the previous quarter; that is, we assume that the expectations
determining t and ut are those collected in quarter t − 1. Finally, to match the inﬂation
and unemployment data as best as possible with these forecasts, we use rst announced es-
timates of these series.11;12 Our primary sources for our data are the Real-Time Dataset for
Macroeconomists and the Survey of Professional Forecasters, both currently maintained by
the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia (Zarnowitz and Braun (1993), Croushore (1993)
and Croushore and Stark (2001)). Using ordinary least squares, we obtain the following
estimates for our model between 1969:1 and 2002:2:13
t =0 :529
(0:086)
e
t+1 +0:471
(−−)
t−1 −0:304
(0:093)
(ue
t − u
t)+e;t; (3)
SER =1 :38, DW =2 :09,
ut =0 :221
(0:080)
ue
t+1 +1:262
(0:104)
ut−1 −0:529
(0:068)
ut−2 +0:045
(0:022)
u
t +0:033
(0:013)
(~ ra
t−1 − r)+eu;t; (4)
SER =0 :29, DW =2 :08;
The numbers in parentheses are the estimated standard errors of the corresponding regres-
sion coecients. The estimated unemployment equation also includes a constant term that
11This implies that the relevant expectations surprises inﬂuencing current outcomes are those perceived on
the basis of rst announced data and not those dened retrospectively on the basis of subsequent revisions.
We adopt this simplication for its parsimony, recognizing that subsequent revisions of historical data may
at times aect economic decisions in a more complicated manner.
12This is also common in forecast evaluation experiments; for example, Romer and Romer (2000) use
rst-announced outcomes in their evaluation of Federal Reserve Board Greenbook forecasts.
13The starting point of this sample reﬂects the availability of the Survey of Professional Forecasters data.
7provides an estimate of the natural real interest rate plus the average premium of the one-
year Treasury bill rate we use for estimation over the federal funds rate, which corresponds
to the natural rate of interest estimates we use in the model. If this premium equals the
average dierence between the one-year rate and the federal funds rate during this sample,
then the estimation suggests that the natural rate of interest in this sample is 3.2 percent.
To complete our model for simulations, we impose the expectations theory of the term
structure whereby the one-year rate equals the expected average of the federal funds rate
over four quarters.
3.2 Historical Monetary Policy
In addition to the equations for inﬂation and the unemployment rate, we estimate a mone-
tary policy rule according to which the federal funds rate is determined by the lagged funds
rate, the forecast of inﬂation over the next year (dened to be the four-quarter change from
t − 1t ot +3w h e r et denotes the period for which the funds rate is set), the forecasted
change in the unemployment rate over the next year, and the unemployment gap (the un-
employment rate less the real-time estimate of the natural rate) forecasted to occur in three
quarters:
it = iit−1 +(1−i)(r +)+(e
t+3 −)+u(ue
t+3 − ^ u
t)+u(ue
t+3 −ut−1)+i;t (5)
For both estimation and simulation purposes, we assume that the central bank responds
to the private sector forecasts of inﬂation and the unemployment rate in setting policy. As
discussed in Orphanides (2003c) and Orphanides and Williams (2002), this specication
nests both a version of the classic Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993), which excludes the change in
unemployment and lagged interest rate terms (that is sets i = u = 0), as well as rules
robust to natural rate misperceptions (the limiting case with i =1a n du =0 )
To allow the rule to capture the reduction of activism in Federal Reserve policy following
the summer of 1979, we allow for a break in the policy rule at that time. To examine
this eect in a parsimonious manner, we follow the suggestion in Orphanides (2004) and
focus on a specication that allows for a break in the u parameter, keeping remaining
parameters of the policy reaction functions xed. Other things equal, a reduction in the
policy responsiveness to the perceived gap in the forecast of unemployment from its natural
8rate, u would reﬂect a reduction in activism in this policy rule.14 Allowing for this break,
our estimated policy rule is given by:
it =0 :750
(0:044)
it−1 +0:250
(−−)
(r + )+ 0 :779
(0:130)
(e
t+3 − ) −0:673
(0:210)
(ue
t+3 − ut−1)+
( −1:131
(0:197)
+0:561
(0:158)
D)(ue
t+3 − ^ u
t)+i;t; (6)
SER =1 :02, DW =1 :90;
where D is a dummy variable equaling zero before 1979:3 and one thereafter. Conditional
on a value for the natural rate of interest, r, estimation of this policy rule also provides
an estimate of the implicit inﬂation target, . Assuming r =3 :2 percent, as suggested by
the estimation of equation 2, yields an estimate of 2.7 percent for  with a standard error
equal to 0.15 percent.
As can be seen, and consistent with the narrative evidence, the estimated policy reaction
function points to a substantial reduction in policy activism following the summer of 1979
compared to the earlier period. We note that this policy rule satises the standard stability
condition in models with adaptive or rational expectations that the long-run response of
the nominal interest rate to a change in the inﬂation rate exceeds unity. We do not nd
evidence that policy was inherently destabilizing in the pre-1979 sample, but instead that
it was more activist. This contrasts with the well-known ndings reported by Clarida,
Gali and Gertler (2000), based on a similar specication, but employing the output gap
(instead of the unemployment gap) and relying on instrumental variables analysis with
ex post data (instead of real-time data and forecasts). They suggested that the response
of policy to inﬂation was unstable in the pre-1979 period. However, as documented by
Orphanides (2004), their ndings are overturned when information actually available to
policymakers in real time is used to estimate the policy rule that they specify. Even when
we allow for breaks in the policy response to both expected inﬂation and to the perceived
14A stability test rejects the constancy of all parameters over the two subsamples. However, once we allow
for the break in u, the stability of individual remaining parameters over the two subsamples cannot be
rejected. As a robustness check for our model, we also examined simulations based on a specication of the
policy rule that allows breaks in two parameters, u and . In that specication, the point estimates of
both  and u are slightly lower in the rst subsample, but the dierence is small relative to our baseline
specication and does not qualitatively inﬂuence our simulation results.
9unemployment gap in our rule, which, as noted earlier, suggests that the coecient on the
inﬂation forecast is a bit lower in the pre-1979 sample, we nd that the estimation provides
no evidence supporting the hypothesis of policy instability.
4 Expectations Formation
Following Orphanides and Williams (2003, forthcoming), we assume that agents reestimate
their forecasting models each period using a constant gain algorithm that places more weight
on recent observations.15 Given the structure of the model, agents need to forecast inﬂation,
the unemployment rate, and the federal funds rate for up to four quarters in the future. As
noted above, we assume the policymaker uses private agents' forecasts in setting policy.
4.1 Perpetual Learning with Least Squares
Under perfect knowledge with no shocks to the natural rate of unemployment, the pre-
dictable components of inﬂation, the unemployment rate, and the funds rate each depend
on a constant, one lag each of the inﬂation and the ex post real funds rate (the dierence
between the nominal funds rate and the inﬂation rate), and two lags of the unemployment
rate. We assume that agents estimate forecasting equations for the three variables using a
restricted VAR of this form. They then construct multi-period forecasts from the estimated
VAR. To x notation, let Yt denote the 13 vector consisting of the inﬂation rate, the unem-
ployment rate, and the federal funds rate, each measured at time t: Yt =( t;u t;i t); let Xt
be the 51 vector of regressors in the forecast model: Xt =( 1 ; t−1;u t−1;u t−2;i t−1−t−1);
let ct be the 5 3 vector of coecients of the forecasting model.
Using data through period t, the least squares regression parameters for the forecasting
model can be written in recursive form:
ct = ct−1 + tR−1
t Xt(Yt − X0
tct−1); (7)
Rt = Rt−1 + t(XtX0
t − Rt−1); (8)
15See also Sargent (1999), Cogley and Sargent (2001), Evans and Honkapohja (2001), and Gaspar and
Smets (2002) for related treatments of learning. A separate strand of the literature has focused on the
problem of estimating the implicit inﬂation target of the central bank, assuming that other parameters are
known. See e.g. Bomm et al (1997), Erceg and Levin (2003), Kozicki and Tinsley (2003), and Rudebusch
and Wu (2003).
10where t is the gain.
Under the assumption of least squares learning with innite memory, t =1 =t,s oa st
increases, t converges to zero. As a result, as the data accumulate this mechanism converges
to the correct expectations functions and the economy converges to the perfect knowledge
benchmark solution. As noted above, to formalize perpetual learning|as would be implied
by the presence of structural changes such as shifts in the natural rate of unemployment|
we replace the decreasing gain in the innite memory recursion with a small constant gain,
>0.16
With imperfect knowledge, expectations are based on the perceived law of motion of
the inﬂation process, governed by the perpetual learning algorithm described above. The
model under imperfect knowledge consists of the structural equations for inﬂation, the
unemployment gap, the federal funds rate (the monetary policy rule), and the forecasts
generated from the forecasting model.
We should emphasize that in the limit of perfect knowledge (that is, as  ! 0) and
assuming a constant natural rate of unemployment, the expectations function above con-
verges to rational expectations, and the stochastic coecients for the forecasting model
converge to those implied by the structural model equations under rational expectations.
As explained in Orphanides and Williams (forthcoming), this modeling approach accom-
modates the Lucas critique in the sense that expectations formation is endogenous and
adjusts to changes in policy or structure; and, although expectations are \imperfectly" ra-
tional, in that agents are required to estimate the reduced form processes needed to form
expectations, the resulting expectations are close to being ecient.
4.2 Calibrating the Learning Rate
A key parameter for the constant-gain-learning algorithm is the updating rate . To cali-
brate this parameter we examined how well dierent values of  t either the expectations
data from the Survey of Professional Forecasters, or, based on our model, the actual data
on inﬂation and unemployment.
16In terms of forecasting performance, the \optimal" choice of  depends on the relative variances of the
transitory and permanent shocks, as in the relationship between the Kalman gain and the signal-to-noise
ratio in the case of the Kalman lter.
11To examine the t of the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF), we generated a time
series of forecasts using a recursively estimated VAR for the inﬂation rate, the unemploy-
ment rate, and the federal funds rate. In each quarter we reestimated the model using all
historical data available during that quarter (generally from 1948 through the most recent
observation). We allowed for discounting of past observations by using geometrically de-
clining weights. This procedure resulted in reasonably accurate forecasts of inﬂation and
unemployment, with root mean squared errors (RMSE) comparable to the residual standard
errors from the estimated structural equations, (3) and (4). We found that discounting past
data at about 1 percent per quarter yielded forecasts closest on average to the SPF over
1968{2002.17 This corresponds to an updating gain of about 2 percent per quarter during
the 1970s and 1-1/2 percent per quarter in the 1990s.18 In light of these results, we adopted
 =0 :02 as a baseline value for our simulations, but also examined sensitivity of our model
to somewhat lower and higher values.
5 The Interaction of Learning, Misperceptions, and Policy
We examine a set of alternative counterfactual simulations to investigate the role of learning,
natural rate misperceptions, and policy for understanding the behavior of inﬂation and
unemployment and the evolution of policy. We start our simulations at the beginning of
1966, which corresponds to what many observers consider to be the beginning of the Great
Inﬂation in the United States.
5.1 Initial Conditions
The states of the model economy with learning are: the current value and one lag each of the
inﬂation rate and the federal funds rate, the current value and two lags of the unemployment
rate, the true natural rate of unemployment, the real-time estimate of the natural rate, the
shocks to the structural equations, and the matrices C and R for the forecasting model. We
17This nding is also in line with the discounting reported by Sheridan (2003) as best for explaining the
inﬂation expectations data reported in the Livingston Survey.
18As a robustness check, we also examined the degree of discounting that best ts the historical data on
inﬂation and unemployment, given our structural model and learning process. To this end, we simulated
our model from 1966 forward for alternative values of  and examined the mean squared deviations of the
simulated path from the actual paths of inﬂation and unemployment. (Details on simulation of the model
and setting of initial conditions are provided below.) These simulations suggested that our model with values
of  between 0.01 and 0.04 matched the data better than when  was set at lower or higher values.
12initialize the C and R matrices using estimates of the forecasting model by ordinary least
squares on data from 1948 through 1965.
Based on our calibration of the learning rate using survey data, we set  =0 :02 and
compute the implied forecasts from our forecasting model of inﬂation, the unemployment
rate, and the federal funds rate over the 1966 { 2002 period. We treat the forecasts generated
by the learning model as the true data for agents' expectations and then compute tracking
residuals, that is the values of the historical residuals for the equations for the unemployment
rate, the inﬂation rate, and the federal funds rate for 1966{2004. Thus, given these residuals,
the model's predictions will exactly match the historical paths for all endogenous variables.
We then conduct counterfactual experiments in which we modify assumptions regarding
policy or the learning process, but do not change the paths for the equation residuals for
unemployment, inﬂation, and the federal funds rate which we assume are exogenous. Each
counterfactual simulation starts in the rst quarter of 1966 and ends in the fourth quarter
of 2002.
5.2 The Role of Natural Rate Misperceptions
Our rst experiment is a simulation in which policy follows the estimated policy rule (in-
cluding residuals), but the policymaker is assumed to observe the true value of the natural
rate of unemployment in real time. That is, there are no natural rate misperceptions. Note
that because the policy rule matches history under the assumption that the policy was
based on the real-time estimates of the natural rate, the simulation boils down to adding
innovations to the policy rule equal to the coecient on the unemployment gap multiplied
by the real-time misperceptions shown in Figure 3.
Absent natural rate misperceptions, inﬂation would have been relatively stable in the
1970s according to the model. Figure 4 shows the historical paths the simulated paths of
the rates of inﬂation (four-quarter change in the price level) and unemployment. In contrast
to the historical experience when inﬂation reached into double digits, the inﬂation rate with
no natural rate misperceptions remains in a relatively narrow range of about 2 percent to
4 percent during the 1970s. The stability in inﬂation is achieved through a tighter path
for policy starting in 1966 that drives the unemployment rate above its historical path.
13This eective stabilization of inﬂation avoids the rise in unemployment associated with the
Volcker disinﬂation occurring at the end of the decade and into the early 1980s.
The policy without natural rate misperceptions also avoids the damaging shift in the
perceived law of motion of inﬂation evident in the historical data. Absent the rise in
inﬂation in the late 1960s and 1970s, the expected level of inﬂation also remains subdued.
In addition, the perceived persistence in inﬂation remains moderate. The solid line in Figure
5 shows the estimated coecient on lagged inﬂation in the forecasting equation for inﬂation
that incorporates learning, as described above. This statistic usefully summarizes agents'
perceptions of the persistence in inﬂation. Based on the historical data, the perceived
persistence in inﬂation rises to about 0.9 by 1975.19 In contrast, under the same policy,
but absent natural rate misperceptions, the perceived persistence in inﬂation would have
remained moderate throughout the 1960s and 1970s. In this simulation, the trend rise in
inﬂation associated with the \Great Inﬂation" is avoided and inﬂation expectations remain
well anchored.
5.3 The Role of Learning
Even in the presence of policy errors driven by misperceptions of the natural rate of un-
employment, economic outcomes during the Great Inﬂation could have been much less
unfavorable if expectations had remained well anchored and governed by the forecasting
processes in place before. In particular, had the policy errors of the late 1960s not resulted
in the steep increase in the persistence of inﬂation (as shown in Figure 5) the inﬂationary
impulses of the late 1960s and early 1970s would have been contained much more easily and
price stability restored at a lower cost.
To illustrate the role of learning in this case, in Figure 6 we examine two counterfactual
experiments where the historical policy rule is followed, but the process governing the
formation of expectations is assumed to remain unchanged and is governed by the reduced
form VAR in place at the beginning of the simulation, in 1966. Thus, in these simulations,
expectations of inﬂation remain well anchored through time by design. In the simulation
19This rise in perceived inﬂation persistence in our model is a manifestation of the real-world accumulation
of evidence against the hypothesis of a long-run tradeo between unemployment and inﬂation and in favor
of the \accelerationist" view during the 1970s.
14shown with the dashed lines we posit that policy continues to make the errors associated
with natural rate misperceptions. As can be seen, despite the policy errors due to the
natural rate misperceptions, if the favorable expectations mechanism in place before the
Great Inﬂation could have been maintained, that is in the absence of learning, economic
outcomes would have been signicantly better.
In addition, had the inﬂation expectations process remained as favorable, the role of the
policy errors induced by the misperceptions of the natural rate would have been much less
important. To illustrate this point, the dash-dot lines in the gure present a counterfactual
simulation in which both expectations formation remains unchanged, and the policymaker
is assumed to avoid natural rate misperceptions in setting policy. As can be seen, the
dierence in the path of inﬂation in the two simulations is not very dramatic. This conrms
the importance of the interaction of policy errors due to natural rate misperceptions with
the learning dynamics regarding expectations for understanding the Great Inﬂation.
5.4 The Role of Policy Activism
The simulations above suggest that under some conditions the activist policy pursued during
the Great Inﬂation could have been successful. In particular, if policymakers could have
avoided misperceptions in the natural rate or, if expectations could have remained favorable
even in the face of the policy errors caused by the combination of policy activism and
natural rate misperceptions, the stagﬂation of the 1970s would not have occurred. But, of
course, neither of these conditions could be taken for granted as the basis for policy design,
and the possibility that they might fail, as they did during the Great Inﬂation, limits the
scope for activist stabilization policy. An insucient understanding of these limits and of
the long-term damage to expectations formation resulting from activist policy errors likely
contributed to the policy failure of the 1970s.
A natural question is whether a less activist approach, such as the one adopted following
the policy change in 1979, would have represented better policy during the Great Inﬂation as
well. To examine the role of policy activism, our third set of experiments examines what the
historical outcomes could have been in the presence of learning and of the observed natural
rate given by our real-time estimates if policy were driven by a less activist approach than
15the one observed.20 Figures 7 and 8 summarize the results from two such experiments.
In one, policy does not respond to the unemployment gap at all, and in the other, policy
follows the estimated post-1979 reaction function.
If policymakers had followed either of these policies starting in 1966, the rise in inﬂation
in the 1970s would have been less pronounced and the unemployment rate would have been
lower on average than it actually was. The nding that both inﬂation and unemployment
would have been lower in the 1970s if the Fed had followed the estimated post-1979 re-
action function during the late 1960s and 1970s, or if the Fed had not responded to the
unemployment (or output) gap, diers from the results of Judd and Rudebusch (1998) and
Orphanides (2003b), respectively, who nd that such policies would have implied lower in-
ﬂation, but at the cost of lower output during the 1970s (implying a higher unemployment
rate). An important dierence is that these analyses were based on the assumption of
backward-looking accelerationist models that implicitly treat inﬂation expectations as in-
variant to monetary policy. Our results illustrate the importance of endogenous formation
of expectations in aecting the tradeos available to policymakers in designing monetary
policies.
A key result in our analysis is that under the less activist policies, the natural rate
misperceptions of the 1960s and 1970s would not have been sucient to destabilize the
inﬂation expectations process even with the perpetual learning process governing the for-
mation of expectations. Importanely, as can be seen in Figure 8, the reduced activism
would have avoided the dramatic increase in agents' perceptions of the persistence of in-
ﬂation. By maintaining well-anchored inﬂation expectations throughout the 1970s, these
policies would have avoided the stagﬂationary outcomes of the decade. Our simulations
also suggest that, in line with the results in Orphanides and Williams (forthcomning), the
reduced activism would have facilitated the formation of somewhat more accurate forecasts.
The RMSE of agent's forecast errors for both inﬂation and unemployment are smaller under
20This experiment is a rst step towards investigating the design of ecient monetary policy in our
estimated model, accounting for the role of perpetual learning and its inﬂuence on the inﬂation expectations
process. An active literature over the past several years has been exploring issues related to ecient policy
design in the presence of uncertainty regarding models, data, and natural rates. See e.g. Levin et al (1999,
2003), Orphanides (2003a), Orphanides et al (2000), Orphanides and Williams (2002), Rudebusch (2001,
2002), and references therein.
16the alternative simulations relative to the baseline.
Indeed, the realization of the role of the policy mistakes of the 1970s in destabilizing
inﬂation expectations was a key reason leading to the policy change in 1979. As Stephen
Axilrod summarized:21
Not all exogenous forces are purely exogenous. Rising inﬂationary expectations
in the late 1970s were in part the product of earlier monetary policies (as well as
other events) as these policies aected attitudes toward the future, ... but once
embedded the expectations were exogenous to and inﬂuenced current policies|
as in October 1979. (1985, p. 14.)
5.5 Robustness
As a robustness check for our key results regarding the wisdom of reduced policy activism, we
also examined counterfactual simulations under alternative assumptions regarding learning
and the formation of expectations. We concentrated our attention on the robustness of
the nding that if policy during the Great Inﬂation had followed the less activist approach
adopted after 1979, inﬂation expectations would have remained well behaved during the
1970s and the stagﬂation experienced during that decade would have been avoided.
We considered the sensitivity of our results to the updating parameter  by comparing
counterfactual simulations for three dierent values of  =0 :01;0:02;0:03 for the counter-
factual policy rule experiments. Qualitatively, the results are quite similar across the three
values of . In fact, the rise in the rate of inﬂation during the late 1970s appears less pro-
nounced both for the smaller and larger values of  than in the baseline case of  =0 :02. In
this sense, our baseline choice for  is conservative in terms of the eects of the interaction
of learning and policy errors.
We also examined the sensitivity of our results for the choice of initial conditions govern-
ing the formation of expectations. Instead of the initial conditions estimated through the
end of 1965, we examined simulations with estimated initial conditions later in the sample.
We also considered as initial conditions the reduced-form coecients corresponding to the
model-consistent solution of the model. In either case, these alternative initial conditions
are somewhat less favorable than the ones used in the simulations reported before. As a
21Stephen Axilrod, a member of the Federal Reserve Board sta, served as the FOMC Economist at the
time of the 1979 policy change.
17result, inﬂation outcomes for the early 1970s are worse under these alternatives relative to
our baseline specication. However, our simulations suggest that even with these less favor-
able initial conditions, inﬂation in the mid- and late-1970s would have been considerably
lower if policy had followed the estimated post-1979 rule. As a result the stagﬂation of the
1970s would not have occurred if the post-1979 policy had been in place in the late 1960s
and 1970s as well.
6 Conclusion
In principle, the activist approach to macroeconomic stabilization that underlay the mon-
etary policy decisions of the late 1960s and 1970s could have been successful in stabilizing
economic ﬂuctuations while maintaining price stability if policymakers had had accurate
assessments of the natural rate of unemployment. In the event, the natural rate estimates
proved to be highly inaccurate, and the unemployment gap (and the related output gap)
turned out to be a poor guide for policy in practice. On their own, these policy errors
would not have been disastrous to macroeconomic performance if inﬂation expectations
had remained as favorable as they were before the Great Inﬂation got underway. But, in a
dynamic economy with agents continuously learning, the rise in inﬂation resulting from the
policy errors and the activist approach to stabilization policy unmoored inﬂation expecta-
tions, eventually resulting in the stagﬂation of the 1970s. Towards the end of that decade,
the fatal ﬂaw in activist policy strategies was recognized. Out of this experience grew the
realization that active control of resource utilization should be downplayed and that poli-
cies focusing on price stability could achieve better outcomes in terms of the stabilization
of both inﬂation and unemployment.
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Notes: Inﬂation measured by the change of the output deﬂator (annual rate).
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Unemployment and its Natural Rate
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Notes: The retrospective natural rate reﬂects the current estimate of the NAIRU from the
Congressional Budget Oce. The real-time series is as described in the text.
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Outcomes with No Natural Rate Misperceptions
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Notes: The two panels show historical and simulated paths of the rates of inﬂation and un-
employment. The solid lines show the historical data. The dashed lines show the simulated
paths assuming that the monetary policymaker knows the true value of the natural rate of
unemployment in real time. Each simulation starts in the rst quarter of 1966.
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Evolution of Inﬂation Persistence in the Inﬂation Forecasting Equation
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Notes: The lines show the simulated paths of the coecient on lagged inﬂation in agents'
inﬂation forecasting equations. The path shown by the solid line is based on the historical
data. The dashed line shows the simulated path in which the policymaker knows the true
value of the natural rate of unemployment in real time. Each simulation starts in the rst
quarter of 1966.
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Outcomes with Fixed-Coecient Expectations
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unemployment. The solid lines show the historical data. The dashed and dash-dot lines
show the simulated paths assuming that the agents do not update their forecasting models
from 1966 on. Each simulation starts in the rst quarter of 1966.
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Outcomes with Alternative Policy Rules
Inﬂation Rate
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Percent
Historical data
Post−79 policy rule
No policy response to unemployment gap
Unemployment Rate
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Historical data
Post−79 policy rule
No response to unemployment
Natural rate of unemployment
Notes: The two panels show historical and simulated paths of the rates of inﬂation and
the unemployment. The paths shown by the solid lines are based on the historical data.
The dashed lines show the simulated paths in which monetary policy follows the post-1979
policy rule. The dash-dot lines show the simulated paths when policy does not respond to
the unemployment gap. Each simulation starts in the rst quarter of 1966.
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Evolution of Inﬂation Persistence with Alternative Policy Rules
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Notes: The lines show the simulated paths of the coecient on lagged inﬂation in agents'
inﬂation forecasting equations. The path shown by the solid line is based on the historical
data. The dashed line shows the simulated path in which monetary policy follows the post-
1979 policy rule. The dash-dot line shows the simulated path when policy does not respond
to the unemployment gap. Each simulation starts in the rst quarter of 1966.
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